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Abstract
A jury of experts is often convened to decide between two states of
Nature relevant to a managerial decision. For example, a legal jury de-
cides between “innocent” and “guilty”, while an economic jury decides
between “high” and “low” growth when there is an investment decision.
Usually the jurors vary in their abilities to determine the actual state.
When the jurors make their collective decision by sequential majority
voting, the order of voting in terms of juror ability can affect the op-
timal probability Q of reaching a correct verdict. We show that when
the jury has size three, Q is maximized if the juror of median ability
votes first. When voting in this order, sequential voting can close more
than 50% of the gap (in terms of Q) between simultaneous voting and
the verdict that would be reached without voting if the jurors’ private
information were made public. Our results have implications for larger
juries, where we answer an age-old question by showing that voting
by seniority (decreasing ability order) is significantly better than by
anti-seniority (increasing ability order).
To obtain our new results we introduce a richer notion of private in-
formation. Instead of the binary information assumed since Condorcet
(for “innocent” or “guilty”), we give each juror a number in interval
[−1,+1] with larger values indicating stronger signals for “innocent”.
Keywords: jury of experts, sequential voting, voting order, group
decision
1 Introduction
A firm or organization has to make an important decision. The best decision
depends on whether Nature is in one of two possible states: A or B. To
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determine which is the actual state, as well as possible, the firm convenes a
jury of experts. For example if the decision of the State is whether to send
someone to jail, it convenes a legal jury to decide whether the defendant
is guilty A or innocent B. The organization running Wimbledon forms an
umpiring team to determine whether a ball is In or Out, and awards the
point accordingly. More often, the jury may consist of economists who aim to
determine the future state of the economy in order to decide whether to make
an investment. In all these cases, the experts (jurors) will in general have
different abilities (or expertise, judgement, eyesight, economic knowledge)
to determine the actual state of Nature. In this paper we assume that
the jurors obtain their verdict by majority rule in an open sequential vote,
also known as roll call voting, and their common aim is to maximize the
probability that their verdict is correct (called strategic voting). We call
such voters jurors because they are voting for the truth rather than for their
preferred outcomes. It is often assumed in the literature that voting order
does not matter, as each voter can assume he is making the pivotal vote.
However, for heterogeneous juries, the voting order assuredly does matter,
as voters need to know not only how many of the others voted each way but
also which jurors voted each way. This observation is the starting point of
our investigations.
The main interest of this paper is to determine the optimal voting order
in terms of the set of abilities of the jurors, the one that maximizes the
probability Q of a correct verdict. Aside from the important work of Dekel
& Piccione (2000), this question has received little attention. For reasons of
a combinatorial nature, our techniques (integer programming and dynamic
programming) are restricted mainly to small juries and our main findings
relate to a jury of size three. We show that it is best (i.e., the afore-defined Q
is maximized) to have the juror of median-level expertise vote first, and that
the order of the last two voters does not matter. When voting in such an
optimal order, sequential voting can close more than 50% of the gap (in terms
of Q) between simultaneous voting and the verdict that would be reached
without voting if the jurors’ private information were made public and the
more likely state of Nature is chosen. Even with such an optimal order of
voting, the jurors in general must vote strategically, rather than honestly (for
the alternative that each deems most likely at the time of voting, given his
private information and prior voting). However, when the alternatives A and
B are equally likely, and the voting sequence is the median ability followed
by highest ability and finally lowest ability (one of the optimal orders), all
the jurors can afford to vote honestly without diminishing their chances of
getting a correct verdict. These results apply as well to the last three jurors
to vote in a larger jury. In tennis or badminton, the A/B call of “In” or
“Out” is first made by a linesman and then can be overcalled by the umpire.
We show that the umpire should have the better eyesight by an argument
which converts it to a three juror model by adding (in our minds) a second
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“blind” (zero ability) linesman who votes second. Another result concerns
the “wrong conviction rate”, the probability that an innocent defendant is
convicted. A classic result of Feddersen & Pesendorfer (1998) established
for simultaneous voting of homogeneous jurors that the wrong conviction
rate increases when a unanimous rather than majority voting is required for
conviction (and voting in both cases is optimized for Q). We show that,
for sequential voting of homogeneous jurors, their result holds only for the
highest level of juror ability, and that the reverse is true otherwise.
Our model assumes that the abilities of the jurors are common knowl-
edge, or at least known to the team leader (foreman) who assigns voting
strategies to the jurors. In the tennis/badminton example, the ability of a
juror (linesman or umpire) might be related in general to his or her physical
position on the court, and in particular to the individual’s eyesight, which
could be measured. Baharad et al. (2012) show how prior voting records
can lead to common knowledge of abilities.
As we have said, our main findings mentioned earlier apply to juries of
size three. Due to the combinatorial nature of our techniques that results
in computational intractability, in general we cannot analyze larger juries.
However, we have spent considerable amount of computer time to determine
an optimal ordering for the single case of a five-member jury with distinct
abilities from 0 to 4 (the full range in our model) and found that it is
(2, 3, 1, 0, 4). Thus our result on “median-ability juror votes first”, which
holds for all juries of size three, also holds for the single distinct-ability jury
of size five, though it still holds for all juries of size five if, as is common
in the literature, there are only two signals (instead of ten signals in our
model). Furthermore, we show our results have general implications for
larger juries.
For honest voting, where each juror votes for the alternative he believes
is more likely, given his private signal and prior voting, we are able to settle
an age old question: Is it better to vote by seniority (more senior, or able,
jurors vote earlier) or by anti-seniority? We use a simulation approach to
show that seniority order is better. For example, when the jury consists
of 13 jurors of random and independent abilities, seniority voting gives the
correct verdict 83% of the time, whereas anti-seniority is correct only 76%
of the time.
It is useful to consider how our model looks from a game theoretic view-
point. Consider our model of strategic voting, where by definition the players
(voters) have a common interest in obtaining the correct verdict. As such,
it is what is known as a common interest game. What makes it interesting
is that the players cannot simply reveal and pool their private information.
This problem is of course inherent in all voting models. In some scenarios
this restriction follows naturally from time considerations, as when referees
make binary (“in” or “out”) line calls in various sports, without revealing
how far in or out they believe the ball (or shuttle) landed. In other cases the
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restriction may be due to the large number of voters. In still other cases,
such as postal voting, the voters may simply have no easy means of direct
communication. So our problem in strategic voters is one of optimizing the
joint strategies of the players to obtain the highest reliability of the verdict,
which may be viewed as a mechanism design problem. On the other hand,
in honest voting each agent can be viewed as wanting his own vote to be
correct (perhaps he is an “expert” and the true state of Nature is soon to be
revealed, as in Ottaviani & Sorensen (2001). In this case our solution may
be viewed as a Nash equilibrium of the game where each players payoff is
1 if his vote is correct and otherwise 0. Our solution is in fact more stable
than a Nash equilibrium: a player would not wish to change his strategy if
none of the prior voters change theirs (but even if later voters do).
The methodology adopted in some parts of this paper is neither experi-
mental nor deductive. Rather we use computer based programming (integer
programming or dynamic programming) to determine the set of optimal
threshold profiles for each a priori probability of state A and each (ordered)
sequence of juror abilities, and then apply exhaustive search to obtain com-
parative general results which hold for all or specified parameters. We use
exact calculations (with fractional probability values) based on Mathemat-
ica. Hence these general results, which we call Propositions, have no proofs.
The data on which the propositions are based are provided in the compan-
ion file to this paper. The results with true deductive proofs are called
Theorems.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Any “voting” is to be
taken as strategic unless honest voting is explicitly specified. After literature
review in the next section, we set up our problem model in Section 3 with
details of its three components: juror abilities together with their signals,
voting dynamics, and the common jury objective. In Sections 4 and 5 we
establish the need for strategic voting (where a player may vote B when
he believes A is more likely) and then study such voting with homogeneous
juries. Our more general results on strategic voting are presented in Section 6
for three-member juries and in Section 7 for larger juries. Finally, before
making some concluding remarks in Section 9, we address in Section 8 the
issue of which ordering is better under honest voting: seniority order or
anti-seniority order.
2 Literature
The literature on using voting to amalgamate private information goes back
at least as far as Condorcet (1785), with his analysis of simultaneous voting.
Descriptions and analysis of various voting methods can be found in the
recent survey of Brams & Fishburn (2002) and the text of Easley & Kleinberg
(2010). In our model the heterogeneous jurors are distinguished by a single
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quality called ability, which describes how well they can guess the truth.
Obviously jurors in a trial are more complicated. Zufryden (1984) presents
a model for attorneys to evaluate and select jurors in order to minimize the
likelihood of large jury awards. In his model, jurors have 14 qualities (such
as Ethnic, Risk avoidance, Dominance, etc.).
Sequential voting in a common-value (jury) environment has received
little attention. In fact the only comparable analysis to ours, admittedly
with a simpler signal and ability structure, is that of Dekel & Piccione
(2000). The main findings of that important paper lie elsewhere, but their
findings on voting order are nicely summarized in the following remarks from
their Conclusions (p. 48):
“. . . if voters are endowed ex ante with differential informa-
tion (some voters can be better informed than other) knowing
which voters voted in favor and which against can affect the
choice of a later voter. It can be shown that, in a common-
value and two signal environment (as in Sec. IIIC above), if the
player’s signals are completely ordered (in the sense of Black-
well), then it is optimal to have the better informed vote earlier.
This provides an interesting contrast to the findings of Ottaviani
& Sorensen (2001). They obtain the opposite optimal order in an
environment in which information providers care not about the
outcome but about appearing to be well informed. It is not dif-
ficult, however, to construct examples in which having the best-
informed voter vote first is not optimal. Hence in seems unlikely
that general insights into this question can be obtained.”
As noted in this quotation, the voters in the model of Ottaviani &
Sorensen (2001) do not have a common interest (in a correct verdict), but
rather are experts who wish to enhance their reputations by voting which
turns out to be informed. The optimality issue for these two voting orders
will be studied in detail in Section 8 for our richer model.
A discussion of the optimal order of experts is given in Ali et al. (2008),
where examples are cited in which courts follow either anti-seniority (in-
creasing “ability” in our terminology) or seniority orders, respectively, in
the ancient Sanhedrin and the contemporary American Supreme Court. The
question of the optimal ordering of state primaries is analyzed in Morton
& Williams (2000) from various perspectives. In our context a “more able”
state is one whose party electorate is closer to the national mean and hence
is a better predictor of the candidate most likely to succeed in the national
election. The order of voting in selection committees is analyzed in Alpern,
Gal & Solan (2010), but common interest only holds there at the firm level,
not for committee members.
The subject of this paper lies more generally within the context of what
is known as social choice theory. The verdict of a jury not only makes a
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statement about the true state of Nature (innocent or guilty in a criminal
trial), but also entails a decision and hence a choice is involved (for example,
whether to send the defendant to jail). The 1951 book of Kenneth Arrow,
now revised as Arrow (2012), provides the foundations of the subject. Chap-
ter 10 of Sen (2014) is devoted to majority choice and gives a discussion of
Condorcets work on voting. Social choice is concerned with the amalgama-
tion of individual preferences and individual information. Our work here fits
mainly into the latter, although in our analysis of honest voting there are
individual preferences as each juror is concerned with being right, instead
of with arriving at a correct majority verdict. More specifically, our work
is set within the context of what is known as Condorcet Theory, stemming
from his original work (Condorcet, 1785). Important recent papers in this
area are Grofman, Owen & Feld (1983); Austen-Smith & Banks (1996) and
Kanazawa (1998). However, the two closest papers on Condorcet Theory
with sequential voting are Dekel & Piccione (2000) and Ottaviani & Sorensen
(2001), which we have discussed earlier.
We finally note that juries, as opposed to general electorates, are usually
small. Three judges often decide a case (as in boxing and weight-lifting
matches, X-Factor competitions) and sometimes only two (as in tennis or
badminton line calls with overrule). Many legal decisions are determined
by a three-judge panel, and appellate courts are often three tiered. Three-
member juries are analyzed theoretically and experimentally in Ali et al.
(2008) and Battaglini, Morton & Palfrey (2007), though their models are
different from ours.
3 The linear-signal model
Given two states of Nature, A and B, denote by θ the a priori probability
of A. The symmetric case θ = 1/2 is referred to as of neutral alternatives.
A group of n agents (jurors) attempts to decide the true state of Nature by
amalgamating their private information through sequential majority voting
towards a verdict V of A or B. Their common aim is to maximize the
probability Q that their collective verdict is the actual state of Nature.
We model the voting problem Γ = Γm,n in terms of the minimum number
of votes m (out of n) required for a verdict of A. We are primarily concerned
with majority voting, where n is odd and a majority of m = (n + 1)/2 is
sufficient for either alternative. We shall also sometimes relate our problem
to one of unanimous voting Γn,n (for say A), where one of the alternatives
requires a unanimous vote. The agents will make their votes strategically
(depending on θ, previous voting, and their private information). The jurors
differ in their ability to discern the state of Nature, so the voting order may
matter.
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3.1 Signals, juror abilities and their distributions
We model the private information of each juror as a signal drawn from a
fixed signal set S = {−9,−7, . . . ,+7,+9} consisting of ten odd numbers.
Positive (res. negative) signals will tend to indicate that A (res. B) is true.
A higher positive signal gives a higher conditional probability of A, so is
considered stronger. Similarly for negative signals.
Given the state of Nature A or B, how can the ability of a juror be
properly reflected in the distribution of signals he receives from the signal
set S? Since we want positive signals to indicate A and negative signals to
indicate B, the simplest assumption, which we adopt here, is to take the
conditional probability Pr[ s |A] = fa(s) of signal s to be a linear function
of s on S, with a positive slope proportional to ability a. Similarly, we want
conditional probability Pr[ s |B] = ga(s) to be linear with negative slope.
That is, high signals are more common than low signals when Nature is A,
and the amount by which they are more common is increasing in a. When
the ability a is 0, we want the slopes of both of these lines to be zero, so
that the signal contains no information. For each juror, a signal near 0 is
of little use in determining the state of Nature, but one with high absolute
value is very useful. Jurors of high ability are more likely to obtain signals
with high absolute values. We choose a discrete set of five equally spaced
abilities a in Ω = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} for our discrete model.
Hence a juror of high ability is more likely to guess the correct state of
Nature, as calculated below in Table 1 at the end of this subsection. Given
our linearity assumption and our division of abilities into five levels, with
level 0 no ability at all, the slope of the line for a = 4 is taken so that the
line hits the s-axis at the end point −9 (for f4) or the end point +9 (for
g4), so we do not have negative probabilities. These assumptions completely
determine the distribution functions fa(s) and ga(s) as follows (illustrated
in Figure 1):
fa(s) = Pr[ s |Nature is A] ≡ 110 +
(
a
360
)
s;
ga(s) = Pr[ s |Nature is B] ≡ fa(−s).
Many of our important calculations will involve the cumulative distribu-
tions of the signals. These are given for even thresholds 2j, with parameter
a indicating ability, by the quadratic functions Fa(2j) (when Nature is A)
and Ga(2j) (when Nature is B) as follows:
Pr[ s < 2j |Nature is A] = Fa(2j) = (5 + j)
(
1
10 − a(5−j)360
)
; (1)
Pr[ s < 2j |Nature is B] = Ga(2j) = (5 + j)
(
1
10 +
a(5−j)
360
)
. (2)
To illustrate how the ability a of a juror affects his probability of obtain-
ing a correct vote, we consider he is a jury of one facing neutral (equiprob-
able) alternatives A and B. In this case the probability Q(a) that Nature
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Figure 1: Signal distributions f4(s) and g2(s)
is (say) B given that he receives a negative signal s, is the same as the
probability Q of a correct verdict when he is a jury of one, namely
Q(a) =
Ga(0)
Fa(0) +Ga(0)
.
Table 1 shows that a juror of ability 0 is just guessing, while a juror of top
ability a = 4 gets it right 78% of the time.
a 0 1 2 3 4
Q (a) .50 .57 .64 .71 .78
Table 1: Impact of abilities
3.2 Voting thresholds
When juror k comes up to vote, he votes A if his odd signal sk is above an
even threshold τk = τk(v1, v2, . . . , vk−1), where vj ∈ {A,B} is the vote of
the jth earlier juror, j = 1, . . . , k − 1. That is
vk = A if and only if sk > τk.
When there are n = 3 jurors, the threshold vector τ has five coordinates for
majority voting:
τ = (τ1, τ2 (B) , τ2 (A) , τ3 (AB) , τ3 (BA))
= (v, w, x, y, z) ,
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as τ (AA) and τ (BB) can be ignored since a majority has already been
reached. Since signal indices are odd, we index the thresholds T by even
numbers: T = {−10,−8, . . . ,+10}. Note that threshold −10 is a certain
vote for A and +10 is a certain vote for B. For example, given signal
vector s = (s1, s2, s3) = (1,−3, 5) and threshold vector (strategy profile)
τ = (2,−4, 6,−8, 10), the voting sequence is v1 = B (because s1 = 1 <
2 = τ1), v2 = A (because s2 = −3 > τ2 (v1) = τ2 (B) = −4), and v3 = B
(because juror 3 always votes B after BA as that threshold is +10). The
voting sequence BAB determined by s and τ thus gives a majority verdict
V = V (BAB) of B.
3.3 Probability of correct verdict
Suppose we have three jurors of abilities a, b, c in order of voting. If we
know their thresholds τ = (v, w, x, y, z), then for each state of Nature we
can evaluate the probability of all voting sequences and consequently the
probability Q that the verdict is the actual state of Nature, that is, the
probability it is correct. If Nature is in state A, then the three voting
sequences AA, ABA and BAA lead to a correct verdict; if Nature is in state
B, then this holds for BB, BAB and ABB. For example, the probability
that Nature is in state A and the voting sequence is ABA is given by θ (1−
Fa (v))Fb (x) (1− Fc (y)). More generally, we can write Q as the sum of the
six possible ways of getting a correct verdict as follows:
Q(θ; a, b, c; v, w, x, y, z) =
θ((1− Fa(v))(1− Fb(x)) + (1− Fa(v))Fb(x)(1− Fc(y))
+ Fa(v)(1− Fb(w))(1− Fc(z))) + (1− θ)(Ga(v)Gb(w)
+Ga(v)(1−Gb(w))Gc(z) + (1−Ga(v))Gb(x)Gc(y)).
For a fixed order in which jurors of different abilities may vote, we jointly
optimize their thresholds and call the optimal probability of correct verdict
Q¯ = Q¯ (θ; a, b, c). We solve the following integer program:
Q¯ (θ; a, b, c) = max
v,w,z,y,z∈T
Q(θ; a, b, c; v, w, x, y, z).
Denote by τ¯ = τ¯(θ; a, b, c) = (v¯, w¯, x¯, y¯, z¯) any optimal (strategic) threshold
profile. The evaluation of Q¯ for the case of three jurors may also be carried
out via dynamic programming. For large juries, our discrete approach is not
feasible, but some observations extended from the case n = 3 are mentioned
later. Corresponding to our discrete signals, thresholds and juror abilities,
we consider the a priori probability θ ∈ {0.1, . . . , 0.9}.
In contrast to the optimal (strategic) threshold profile τ¯ , it is useful
to consider honest voting, with honest thresholds τ˜ = (v˜, w˜, x˜, y˜, z˜) and
correctness probability Q˜ = Q(θ; a, b, c; τ˜). Honest voting is best defined
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recursively. The first juror votes A if his subjective probability of A, given
a priori probability θ and his private information s1, is at least 1/2. For
θ = 1/2, this means that his honest threshold is 0. Suppose that the first
k− 1 jurors have chosen honest thresholds and the voting has gone in some
sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vk−1). Then the kth juror votes honestly if he votes
for the more likely state of Nature, given all this information and his signal
sk. His honest threshold τ˜k (v1, v2, . . . , vk−1) is the even number between
the lowest (odd-numbered) signal for which he votes A and the highest for
which he votes B. Thus τ˜ can be computed recursively (for any number
of voters n). An interesting question is when (if ever) is τ˜ = τ¯ and hence
Q˜ = Q¯. That is, when is honest voting optimal? This will be addressed in
Propositions 6 and 7.
We note that instead of optimizing the probability Q of a correct verdict,
we could specify positive costs C1 and C2 for verdict V = A when Nature is
B or verdict V = B when Nature is A, and then minimize the expected cost.
Our methods apply equally well to the general case by suitably adapting the
definition of Q.
4 Optimal thresholds and need for strategic voting
This explanatory section gives some examples that demonstrate the neces-
sity of strategic voting and motivate our results on optimal voting orders
presented in the Section 6. For simplicity we assume neutral alternatives in
this section, θ = 1/2.
We have listed in Table 2 an optimal threshold profile for each voting
order of abilities of a jury. Of particular interest (to be discussed below)
are the zero threshold profiles for homogeneous abilities (a, a, a) for a ∈ Ω,
the skewed (asymmetric) profile for ability order (1, 2, 4), and the extreme
(±10) thresholds for the second voter in the bold profiles.
4.1 Two yokels and a boffin
Some special combinations of abilities {a, b, c} lead to particularly intuitive
results. Suppose the jurors have abilities a, b < c, where two of the jurors
have low abilities compared with the third. With no offense intended we
call the situation two yokels and a boffin (2Y1B), when an optimal strategy
(threshold profile) has the second yokel always vote opposite to the first
one, thus canceling out his vote. Such situations are highlighted in bold in
Table 2 with the second yokel’s thresholds (−10, 10). (Recall that these are
the second and third elements of the five-element threshold vector.) This
leaves the real decision up to the boffin. However, in some cases the boffin
may obtain useful information from the vote of the first yokel (but obviously
not from the second, who votes without looking at his own signal).
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Note that the 2Y1B phenomena demonstrated in Table 2 depend on
voting orders, whose optimality we will address in Section 6. To get some
intuition for our main results, let us consider voting order (1, 0, 4) in the
2Y1B context. We compare honest voting with strategic (optimal) voting.
In honest voting, the first juror (smart yokel) believes that A is more likely
if and only if he gets a positive signal, so his threshold is 0. The second juror
has a meaningless signal, as his ability is 0. Therefore, whatever the first
yokel votes for will be copied by the second yokel, creating a majority for
the first yokel’s choice. Thus with honest voting, juror 1 (with low ability)
is the sole determinant of the verdict. The boffin is never even consulted
(assuming voting ceases after a majority is reached)! This is a miniature
example of an information cascade, which is avoided by strategic voting as
seen below.
With strategic voting, the optimal thresholds of −10 (always vote A)
and +10 (always vote B) for voter 2 (after first vote B and A, respectively),
as indicated in the second row and first column of the last block of Table 2,
require him to always vote the opposite of voter 1. This leaves the verdict
up to the boffin, juror 3, of ability 4. Clearly it is better for the boffin of
ability 4 to make the decision than the yokel of ability 1, an improvement
from Q(1) = 0.57 to Q(4) = 0.78 (as calculated in Table 1). Of course in
some cases (where he gets a weak signal), the boffin may improve further
by taking into account the vote of the first voter.
When we are in the 2Y1B situation, the vote of the second yokel carries
no information; but the vote of the first yokel does (if his ability is not 0). If
the boffin votes after the first yokel, he can go with the first yokel’s vote if
his own signal is very small, say ±1. (This argument would be even cleaner
if we allowed a neutral signal of 0). So in order for the boffin to obtain useful
information from the smart yokel, we need two conditions:
• The smart yokel must vote before the complete yokel, and
• The smart yokel must vote before the boffin.
Hence the only ordering in which the boffin can make use of the infor-
mation contained in the smart yokel’s vote is:
• The smart yokel votes first.
Note that in our example this means that the juror of median ability
votes first in the optimal ordering. This turns out to be true generally.
4.2 One or two complete yokels
In the extreme 2Y1B cases with ability multi-sets {0, 0, a} (a > 0) (i.e.,
two complete yokels and one juror with positive ability), our computational
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results show that, regardless of the value θ for the a priori probability of A
and of the voting order, the optimal Q-value is determined by the ability of
the boffin.
We conclude this section with the analysis of another special case that
will have applications later. Let θ be arbitrary and the three abilities of
the jurors, in voting order, are a, 0, b, where a, b > 0. That is, the second
voter is a complete yokel. Suppose that juror 1 votes A. If juror 2 votes A,
the verdict is A and the last juror never gets to vote. Clearly the jury can
do at least as well if juror 2 votes B and leaves the voting up to the last
juror, because the last juror can always vote A and do the same as in the
previous case. (Of course if the subjective probability of A for the last juror
is less than 1/2 he can vote B and do better.) The same reasoning applies if
juror 1 votes B. We can also check this argument by establishing via integer
programming that
Q¯(θ, a, 0, b) = max
−5≤v,y,z≤+5
Q(θ; a, 0, b; 2v,−10, 10, 2y, 2z),
or equivalently (w¯, x¯) = (−10, 10). Summarizing this last argument, we have
shown the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any θ and positive abilities a and b, the voting ability order
(a, 0, b) has optimal thresholds for the second juror of (w¯, x¯) = (−10, 10).
That is, he always votes against the fist juror.
5 Homogeneous jurors and symmetric profiles
In this section we present some results on optimal voting strategies for a
fixed voting order, leaving comparison of voting orders to the next section.
First we consider sequential voting of homogeneous ability jurors and then
we consider the optimality of voting strategies which are in some sense sym-
metric with respect to the alternatives A and B, which we assume to be
equiprobable in this section.
5.1 Juries of homogeneous abilities
Apart from sequential voting, our model includes two elements not ordi-
narily found in the literature: multiple (rather than binary) signals and
heterogeneous jurors (of differing abilities). It is the latter assumption that
creates the rich and counterintuitive flavor of our model. This can be easily
demonstrated by simply calculating the five homogeneous optimal thresh-
olds uniquely as τ¯(1/2, a, a, a) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) for all abilities a ∈ Ω (except
that the uniqueness does not hold for ability a = 0 for an obvious reason),
as shown in Table 2. That is, each juror votes A exactly when he receives
a positive signal, regardless of previous voting. We can rephrase this as the
following elementary observation.
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Ability Pm Pu Em Eu Fm Fu
1 .5 .398 .397 .311 .397 .514
2 .5 .417 .297 .242 .297 .407
3 .5 .449 .206 .184 .206 .285
4 .5 .494 .126 .136 .126 .148
Table 3: Comparison of voting rules for homogeneous jurors
Proposition 2. Facing neutral alternatives, homogeneous jurors can vote
optimally by voting myopically without observing previous votes, as if they
were voting in a secret (or simultaneous) ballot.
Thus when jurors are homogeneous, each can indeed vote as if they are
the pivotal voter, and ignore any prior voting that they witness. Further-
more, we have the following simple results concerning conviction rate and
verdict errors when compared with unanimous voting system Γ3,3, which are
further detailed in Table 3, where Pm denotes conviction rate under majority
rule, Em rate of conviction error under majority rule, and Fm rate of acquit-
tal error under majority rule, with the corresponding rates for unanimous
voting having subscript u.
Proposition 3. For homogeneous jurors with optimal voting strategies, ma-
jority rule leads to a higher conviction rate but lower rate of wrong acquittals
when compared with unanimous voting rule. On the other hand, majority
rule has a lower rate of wrong conviction for the highest-ability jury (a = 4),
but otherwise a higher rate (for any a < 4).
A celebrated result of Feddersen & Pesendorfer (1998) showed that for
simultaneous voting, the rate of wrong conviction (conviction error) was
lower for majority rule than with a unanimous requirement for conviction.
For sequential voting, however, our above result shows that their finding
holds only for the highest ability (a = 4) jury, and the comparison goes the
other way for all other juries.
5.2 Optimality of symmetric strategic profiles
Table 2 gives some optimal profiles for the neutral alternative case θ = 1/2,
where there is an obvious symmetry between the two states of Nature, A
and B. To exploit this symmetry, we define the transposition function given
by Aˆ = B and Bˆ = A. We can extend this to partial voting histories
v = (v1, v2, . . . , vk−1), where vi ∈ {A,B}, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and k = 1, . . . , n,
by defining vˆ = (vˆ1, vˆ2, . . . , vˆk−1) and to thresholds by τˆ (v) = −τ (vˆ). For
example, if profile τ votes A after previous voting B with signal s2 > 4,
then τˆ votes B after previous voting A with signal s2 < −4. Clearly for
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θ = 1/2 the profiles τ and τˆ yield the same correctness probability Q. Thus
if τ is optimal for some ability parameters, so is τˆ . Thus optimal (threshold)
strategies come in pairs (just like conjugate pairs for quadratic equations).
We call a profile τ symmetric if τ = τˆ , or equivalently if τ (v) = −τ (vˆ) for
all voting histories v. In particular, for symmetric thresholds τ we have τ1 =
0. One question we may naturally ask is whether for neutral alternatives
θ = 1/2 there is always an optimal threshold τ¯ that is symmetric.
To answer this question, look at the entry in Table 2 for the optimal
threshold for ability voting order (1, 2, 4): (2,−8, 10,−2, 0). The transposed
threshold is of course also optimal, but it can be shown by exhaustive search
that these are the only two. So in particular there is no optimal threshold
profile for (1, 2, 4) with first coordinate τ1 = 0, no symmetric optimal thresh-
old. Thus, despite the symmetric nature of the optimization problem, the
first juror must skew his vote to either B (by requiring a signal more than
2 to vote A) or to A (requiring a signal less than −2 to vote B). Given this
example, it is perhaps surprising to note the following general result, which
says that such skewing is not necessary for particular voting orders.
Proposition 4. If θ = 1/2, the jurors’ abilities are labeled a < b < c and
the juror of median ability b votes first, then there is an optimal threshold τ¯
that is symmetric.
In fact, Table 2, in which we have listed a symmetric threshold profile
whenever one of these is optimal, shows more than what is stated in the
above proposition. Note that for the ability ordering (2, 1, 4) where the
median ability juror votes first, there is indeed a symmetric threshold. We
will see later that voting orders with median-ability jurors first are of more
special interest.
6 Main results on strategic voting
In this section we present our main results on the optimal voting orders for
jurors of differing abilities.
Given a set of abilities {a, b, c} (technically a multi-set, as repetitions
are allowed) for three jurors, with a ≤ b ≤ c, what voting order achieves
the maximum probability Q¯ of the correct verdict optimized in terms of
threshold strategy profiles? How much is this optimal probability? Our
approach is to calculate Q¯ for various orderings of the jurors and attempt
to spot patterns of optimality. We then check these patterns by exhaustive
search over all voting orders and values of θ to see where they hold.
6.1 Optimal ordering for strategic voting
To give the reader a small taste of the pattern recognition problem, Table 4
provides some results for the voting problem with (left side) an asymmetric
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a priori probability θ = 4/5 of A and ability set {1, 2, 3} and with (right
side) the neutral alternative case θ = 1/2 and ability set {1, 2, 4}. For each
case, the six rows correspond to the six voting orders. For each voting order,
we give the optimal probability Q¯ of correct verdict. For a later discussion
in Section 6.3, we also give the probability of a correct verdict Q˜ attained
when voting honestly. Note that in both (left and right) cases, the highest
value of Q¯ (in bold) is attained when the juror of median ability, in these
cases this is ability 2, votes first. Also note that in all cases, the order of
the last two to vote does not affect Q¯ (see Theorem 11). These observations
from Table 4 in fact hold generally.
θ Ability Order Q¯ Q˜ θ Ability Order Q¯ Q˜
4/5 (2, 1, 3) .827 .800 1/2 (2, 1, 4) .794 .639
4/5 (2, 3, 1) .827 .815 1/2 (2, 4, 1) .794 .794
4/5 (1, 2, 3) .825 .800 1/2 (1, 2, 4) .781 .718
4/5 (1, 3, 2) .825 .8169 1/2 (1, 4, 2) .781 .781
4/5 (3, 1, 2) .825 .815 1/2 (4, 1, 2) .780 .778
4/5 (3, 2, 1) .825 .8172 1/2 (4, 2, 1) .780 .778
Table 4: Best Q-value comparison of ability orders under strategic and hon-
est voting
Proposition 5. For any three-member jury and any probability θ of alter-
native A, the probability Q¯ of a correct verdict under sequential majority
voting is maximized when a juror of median-level ability votes first. For
neutral alternatives (θ = 1/2) it is always suboptimal if a juror who does
not have median ability votes first. The order of the last two jurors does not
affect Q¯.
So if we label the abilities of the jurors as a ≤ b ≤ c, then the two optimal
voting orders are (b, a, c) and (b, c, a). While the last statement of the above
proposition is part of Theorem 11, supporting computational results for the
optimality of median-ability-first order can be found in the companion file,
from which we also note that if the alternatives are not neutral, then there
may be situations where all six voting orders of three abilities give the same
Q.
6.2 Efficiency of sequential voting
Up to this point we have been comparing the relative effectiveness of different
voting orders in attaining a correct verdict for sequential voting. We now fix
the optimal voting order, and compare the effectiveness of sequential voting
to myopic simultaneous voting and the Full Information Solution (FIS),
which we define as the verdict that gives the most likely state (A or B)
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given the signal and the ability of each juror. Note that here there is no
voting involved. In general, the FIS is not always achievable through voting.
Myopic simultaneous voting, also known as Condorcet voting, leaves a gap
with respect to the FIS in terms of the probability of a correct verdict. How
much of this gap can be closed by allowing sequential voting in the optimal
ordering? This depends on the ability set of the jurors. For example, when
the abilities of the jurors are {1, 2, 3}, then Condorcet voting gives a correct
verdict with probability 0.704, sequential voting (in optimal order (2, 1, 3)
or (2, 3, 1)) gives 0.731, and the FIS gives 0.744. Thus there is what we call
the Condorcet Gap (CG) of 0.744 − 0.704 = 0.04 with respect to the FIS.
Sequential voting in the optimal order closes about (0.730−0.704)/(0.744−
0.704) = 0.026/0.04 = 65% of this gap. We call this ratio the Sequential
Bonus (SB). Thus combining one’s own private information with the votes of
prior voters goes a long way towards the solution where private information
is public (the FIS). The first three columns of Table 5 gives the probabilities
of a correct verdict for myopic simultaneous voting qM , sequential voting
(with optimal voting order) qS , and with full information qF (the FIS). The
last two columns give the Condorcet Gap CG = qF−qM and the fraction SB
of this gap that is closed by sequential voting. The SB is 0 for homogeneous
jurors, which is probably why it has not been studied before. The SB is 1
when the jury has two complete yokels (ability 0) on it, who can vote against
each other to achieve the FIS. For the remaining ability sets, the sequential
bonus varies between 11% (for the nearly homogeneous abilities {3, 4, 4})
and 99% (for abilities {0, 1, 3}), with an average value (taking all ability
sets equally) of 60%. The probability of a correct verdict will also depend,
a posteriori, on the decisiveness of the vote (whether it was 2-1 or 3-0), as
analyzed by Klausner & Pollak (2001) in a different but related context.
6.3 Optimality conditions for honest voting
We now consider two questions of optimality for honest voting, a simple
form of voting which we defined and discussed in Section 3.3. The first is
the same as that we asked for strategic voting as to which voting order is
best when voting honestly. The second asks when honest voting is optimal,
that is, when are the honest (threshold) strategies the same as optimal ones
that maximize Q?
To deal with the first question, we look at Table 4 again, this time
concentrating on the Q˜ columns on the left and the right. Note that on the
left side Q˜ is maximized for ordering (3, 2, 1) = (c, b, a); on the right side, it
is maximized for ordering (2, 4, 1) = (b, c, a). So the orderings are not the
same, but they both end with the juror of least ability (a) voting last. This
is true in general.
Proposition 6. When the jurors vote honestly, the highest correctness prob-
ability Q˜ is always achieved for an ordering in which the juror of least ability
17
Ability set Myopic Opt. Seq. FIS CG SB
{0, 0, 0} 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 −
{0, 0, 1} 0.534722 0.569444 0.569444 0.0347222 1.
{0, 0, 2} 0.569444 0.638889 0.638889 0.0694444 1.
{0, 0, 3} 0.604167 0.708333 0.708333 0.104167 1.
{0, 0, 4} 0.638889 0.777778 0.777778 0.138889 1.
{0, 1, 1} 0.569444 0.586111 0.591667 0.0222222 0.75
{0, 1, 2} 0.604167 0.647222 0.65 0.0458333 0.939394
{0, 1, 3} 0.638889 0.713889 0.715 0.0761111 0.985401
{0, 1, 4} 0.673611 0.780556 0.782778 0.109167 0.979644
{0, 2, 2} 0.638889 0.672222 0.683333 0.0444444 0.75
{0, 2, 3} 0.673611 0.730556 0.738333 0.0647222 0.879828
{0, 2, 4} 0.708333 0.794444 0.8 0.0916667 0.939394
{0, 3, 3} 0.708333 0.758333 0.775 0.0666667 0.75
{0, 3, 4} 0.743056 0.816667 0.828333 0.0852778 0.863192
{0, 4, 4} 0.777778 0.844444 0.866667 0.0888889 0.75
{1, 1, 1} 0.603497 0.603497 0.61194 0.00844264 0.
{1, 1, 2} 0.637549 0.648981 0.660639 0.0230901 0.495112
{1, 1, 3} 0.671602 0.713889 0.722602 0.0510001 0.829158
{1, 1, 4} 0.705654 0.780556 0.787977 0.0823232 0.909845
{1, 2, 2} 0.670932 0.677832 0.693501 0.0225691 0.305722
{1, 2, 3} 0.704315 0.730556 0.744397 0.0400826 0.654674
{1, 2, 4} 0.737697 0.794444 0.804482 0.066785 0.849701
{1, 3, 3} 0.737027 0.75901 0.781338 0.044311 0.496108
{1, 3, 4} 0.76974 0.816667 0.832074 0.0623338 0.752824
{1, 4, 4} 0.801783 0.844444 0.870918 0.0691344 0.617076
{2, 2, 2} 0.702975 0.702975 0.720516 0.0175412 0.
{2, 2, 3} 0.735018 0.741296 0.763505 0.0284866 0.220394
{2, 2, 4} 0.767061 0.795185 0.818609 0.051548 0.545591
{2, 3, 3} 0.765721 0.770556 0.796284 0.0305625 0.158171
{2, 3, 4} 0.796425 0.816667 0.843355 0.04693 0.431318
{2, 4, 4} 0.825789 0.846296 0.879531 0.0537421 0.381592
{3, 3, 3} 0.794416 0.794416 0.822961 0.0285451 0.
{3, 3, 4} 0.82311 0.828889 0.863491 0.0403812 0.143119
{3, 4, 4} 0.849794 0.854815 0.894572 0.0447778 0.112122
{4, 4, 4} 0.8738 0.8738 0.918968 0.0451687 0.
Average − − − 0.0558817 0.602629
Table 5: Efficiency comparison when θ = 0.5
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votes last.
We now consider our second question mentioned above. From Table 4,
we see that this is not possible when θ = 4/5 with ability set is {1, 2, 3}.
For every fixed voting order, honest voting does worse than strategic voting,
Q˜ < Q¯. In fact, the best correctness probability attained honestly, 0.8172,
is less than the worst that can be obtained strategically, 0.825. On the
other hand, the right side of Table 4 shows that for neutral alternatives with
abilities {1, 2, 4}, voting honestly in the order (2, 4, 1) = (b, c, a) achieves the
same correctness probability 0.794 as strategic voting in an optimal order.
This observation holds more generally as follows.
Proposition 7. For neutral alternatives θ = 1/2 and completely hetero-
geneous abilities a < b < c, honest voting in ability order (b, c, a) (which
is one of the optimal orderings for strategic voting) gives the best possible
correctness probability that can be attained for strategic voting in any order.
This result means that when a completely heterogeneous jury faces neu-
tral alternatives, it can afford to vote honestly if it chooses the voting order
(b, c, a). Some further information for the above proposition can be found
in Table 6. Note that in each case the optimal strategy profile is identical
to the honest strategy profile. In particular the profiles are symmetric, as
we expect from honest profiles with neutral alternatives.
Voting order (b, c, a) Optimal Q-value Unique optimal profile
{2, 3, 1} 263360 ≈ 0.731 (0, 4,−4, 10,−10)
{2, 4, 1} 143180 ≈ 0.794 (0, 2,−2, 10,−10)
{3, 4, 1} 4960 ≈ 0.817 (0, 4,−4, 10,−10)
{3, 4, 2} 4960 ≈ 0.817 (0, 4,−4, 10,−10)
Table 6: When honest voting is optimal
7 On larger juries
Some of our main results in the preceding section for three jurors can be
generalized to the case of five jurors and more generally can be used to
analyze any larger juries of n > 3 jurors.
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7.1 Juries of size n = 5
Due to the combinatorial nature of our techniques, it is computationally
prohibitive to carry out the same calculations for a jury of size n = 5 as we
did earlier for n = 3. The number of (threshold) strategy variables (having
an exponential effect on computing time) goes from 5 (with the variables
{x, y, z, v, w} in the definition of Q) to 19 for n = 5. For n = 3 we had
to consider 5 prior voting sequences which did not already determine the
majority verdict, namely ∅ (faced by the first juror), A,B (faced by the
second), and AB,BA (faced by the third). When there are five jurors, we
have ∅; A,B; AA,AB,BA,BB; AAB,ABA,BAA and BBA,BAB,ABB;
AABB,ABAB,ABBA and BBAA,BABA,BAAB (19 in all, as we exclude
prior voting with three votes for some alternative, where a majority has
already been achieved). We can overcome this computational difficulty in
two ways to find optimal orderings for the problem Γ = Γ3,5 with linear
signals.
First we retain our original model, but consider only the single ability
set of completely heterogeneous abilities, namely {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. In this way
we establish the following result by finding (with complete enumeration)
optimal strategy profiles for each of the possible voting orders.
Proposition 8. For a five-member jury of completely heterogenous abilities
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, the orderings (2, 3, 1, 0, 4) and (2, 3, 1, 4, 0) are optimal for se-
quential majority voting with neutral alternatives θ = 1/2. Moreover, the
first two voters (of abilities 2 and 3) can afford to vote honestly. 
Note in particular that when there are five jurors to vote, the one of
median ability should vote first. Then, when there are again an odd number
three left to vote, again the one of median ability should vote first. Also,
when there are an even number four left to vote, one of the two median
ability voters should vote first.
What we have not been able to show is that the median ability juror
should vote first for juries that have more than one juror of the same ability.
To establish this more general result, we need to reduce the size of our signal
space to make our computation tractable.
To this end, we now convert our 10-signal model to the more traditional
one of two signals. We do this by continuing to have Nature send (with the
same distribution as before) one of the signals {−9,−7, . . . ,+9}. However,
a juror is only able to discern the sign of the signal: a minus sign (indicating
B) or a plus sign (indicating A). That is, he gets signal A (a plus sign
signal) with probability 1 − Fa(0) when Nature is A and with probability
1 − Ga(0) when Nature is B. Similarly, he gets signal B (or a minus sign
signal) with probability Fa(0) when Nature is A and with probability Ga(0)
when Nature is B. (So a juror of ability a gets the correct signal with
probability 1−Fa (0) = Ga (0) = (a+ 36) /72.) This reduction in the signal
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space reduces the number of (threshold) strategies for a given prior voting
sequence to three: always vote A; vote B for negative signals (signal B) and
voteA for positive signals (signalA); and always voteB. (The corresponding
thresholds are −10, 0 and +10 in our earlier notation.) Consequently, we
are able to establish the following result by complete enumeration.
Proposition 9. Suppose the jurors get binary signals, as described above,
with neutral alternatives θ = 1/2. Then for a five-member jury of arbitrary
abilities 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d ≤ e ≤ 4, the voting ability sequences (c, d, b, a, e)
and (c, d, b, e, a) are optimal. Moreover, the first two voters (of abilities c
and d) can afford to vote honestly. 
Again, we note that the ordering of the last three agrees with Theorem 11
and that it is optimal for the juror of median ability to vote first. But now
we have this result even for juries with repeated abilities, at the cost of a
reduced signal structure.
7.2 Larger juries
Up to this point we have mainly been concerned with majority verdicts.
It turns out that to obtain certain results on such verdicts we need first
consider verdicts that require a unanimous vote for one outcome (say A).
We will call this unanimous sequential voting. Note that in this case each
juror i (of ability ai) has a single threshold strategy τi = τi(A, . . . , A) as for
the other voting sequences the verdict is already decided. In this subsection
we use the notation Γm,n for a voting scheme where there are n voters and
m votes for A are required for a verdict of A (otherwise the verdict is B).
Unlike our results for majority voting, we can show that for unanimous
voting the voting order does not affect the reliability of the verdict.
Theorem 10. In sequential unanimous voting, the voting order of the jurors
does not affect the correctness probability Q.
Proof. The probability Q of getting the correct verdict (with a priori
probability θ of A) with unanimous voting is given by
Q = θ
∏n
i=1 (1− Fai (τi)) + (1− θ) (1−
∏n
i=1 (1−Gai (τi))) .
Observe that this is the same formula as for the case of simultaneous unan-
imous voting for A, when each juror simply compares their private signal
si to their threshold τi (regardless of other jurors’ votes). Therefore, voting
order does not matter. 
Note that the above result does not depend on the particular form of
the cumulative distribution functions Fa and Ga, so it is quite general. Now
consider sequential majority voting when n = 3. After the first vote by juror
1, the subproblem faced by jurors 2 and 3 is either Γ2,2 on unanimous voting
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for A (if juror 1 chose B) or Γ1,2 on unanimous voting for B (if juror 1 chose
A). So in either case Theorem 10 demonstrates that the voting order of the
last two jurors does not matter. This “explains” the similar observation for
linear signals demonstrated computationally in Proposition 5. We will state
this result more generally in the first part of Theorem 11.
Next consider the majority voting problem Γm,n = Γk+1, 2k+1 when num-
ber of jurors n = 2k+1 is odd and greater than 3. We establish the following.
Theorem 11. In sequential majority voting by an odd-size jury with any
signal distribution, the order of the last two voters does not affect the proba-
bility of a correct verdict. For signal distributions where the voter of median
ability should vote first in a jury of three, the third last to vote should have
median ability of the last three to vote.
Proof. Suppose the first n−3 = 2(k−1) jurors have voted, with a difference
d (necessarily even) between the number of votes for A and B. Consider
the subproblem faced by the last three jurors. If |d| ≥ 4 then the verdict is
already settled. If d = 0, then each alternative has received k − 1 votes, so
the remaining subproblem is Γ2,3, the same as the majority voting problem
for three jurors. Finally, if |d| = 2 then, depending on the sign of d, the
subproblem is a unanimous voting problem for one of the alternatives, and
by Theorem 10, the voting order does not matter. So the ordering is either
irrelevant or the optimal ordering is the same as if the last three voters are
the only voters in a three-person sequential majority voting. 
Based on our empirical explorations for juries of five as discussed in
Section 7.1, we would like to make the following conjecture.
Conjecture: For any jury of any odd size n with linear signals, it is optimal
for maximizing the probability of a correct verdict in sequential majority
strategic voting that the k-th juror to vote has median ability among the
remaining n−k+1 jurors, for any k = 1, . . . , n, where median for a sequence
of even cardinality x is understood as the element in position x/2 + 1 of the
sequence.
8 Seniority vs. anti-seniority order with honest
voting
An important question that has been raised for sequential voting is whether
reliability of the verdict is higher when jurors vote according to seniority
(which we interpret as decreasing order of abilities) or according to anti-
seniority (increasing order of abilities). As quoted in Section 2, Dekel &
Piccione (2000) show that in a certain model with binary signals reliability
is higher for seniority voting, while Ottaviani & Sorensen (2001) find that the
opposite ordering by anti-seniority has a higher reliability in honest voting.
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Jury Size n Rinc(n) Rran(n) Rdec(n)
3 67.4 68.8 70.1
5 70.7 73.2 75.0
7 72.2 74.9 77.5
9 73.3 77.7 80.0
11 74.8 79.2 81.7
13 75.7 80.7 82.7
Table 7: Reliability given as percentage of correct verdicts
In this section, we use simulation to compare these two orderings together
with a random ordering for honest voting in our richer signal model.
Given a jury of ordered abilities a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) and their signals
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), there is a generically unique majority verdict v(a, s) ∈
{A,B} with honest voting. For each jury size n = 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, we de-
termine the mean reliability for a jury of size n, whose abilities {a1, . . . , an}
are randomly generated with random voting order, in seniority order and in
anti-seniority order, respectively. We denote these respective mean reliabil-
ities by Rran(n), Rdec(n) and Rinc(n). We now outline the calculation for
Rdec(n) for any given n, as the other two are similar. We assume A and B
are equiprobable.
1. Generate N independent juries each of random abilities {a1, . . . , an},
which are taken independently and uniformly from interval [0, 1]. Ar-
range these n abilities in non-increasing order to obtain vector a¯, with
a¯1 ≥ a¯2 ≥ · · · ≥ a¯n.
2. For each vector a¯ obtained in Step 1, generate M independent signal
vectors s = (s1, . . . , sn), where si is drawn from the distribution with
cumulative distribution function Fa¯i(x) = (x+1)(a¯ix−a¯i+2)/4, which
is the continuous analog of the distribution given in formula (1), with
assumption that Nature is in state A.
3. For each of the N×M jury-signal pairs (a, s) generated in Steps 1 and
2, calculate the (deterministic) majority verdict v(a¯, s). The percent-
age of these verdicts that are for A is denoted by Rdec(n), which gives
an estimate of the reliability of the verdict. Obviously we would get
the same answer if we assumed that B was the state of Nature.
Our simulation with N = 200 and M = 200 has resulted in the numerical
results as shown in Table 7, from which we observe that
Ra(n) ≤ Ro(n) ≤ Rs(n), n = 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13.
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The interpretation of inequalities is as follows. If one has to set up a
voting order (e.g., by legislation or otherwise) before a jury is randomly
selected, it is best to agree that they will vote in order of seniority (i.e.,
decreasing order of ability). This means that, assuming abilities will be
observable after the jury is chosen (see for example Baharad et al., 2012),
the most able juror should vote first.
We also note from Table 7 that for each type of ordering, reliability
increases with jury size, as in the Condorcet model with binary signals.
This is not surprising, and in fact we can analytically establish a stronger
result.
Theorem 12. Given any honest voting order and two juries of respective
abilities a = (a1, . . . , an) and a˜ = (a1, . . . , an, an+1, an+2) with n odd, the
reliability of the larger jury of abilities a˜ is not less than the reliability of the
smaller jury of abilities a.
Proof. We only need to consider the scenario where the two juries have
different verdicts for a given signal vector s˜ = (s1, . . . , sn, sn+1, sn+2) ≡
(s, sn+1, sn+2). Let v(a, s) = A and v(a˜, s˜) = B. We show that the posterior
probability of B is not smaller than that of A. Given the verdicts of the two
juries, it is clear that the smaller jury votes for A by a single-vote majority
(i.e., (n+ 1)/2 vs. (n− 1)/2) and the last two jurors of the larger jury both
vote for B, which implies, in particular, that when it comes for the last
(n+ 2)nd juror to vote honestly, the posterior probability of B is no smaller
than that of A, as otherwise he would have voted for A. 
9 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed a simple model of sequential majority jury voting, where
voting is between two states of Nature. We show that when the jurors differ
in their abilities (to discern the true state), the order in which they vote can
affect the optimal probability of a correct verdict. We have shown in some
cases (any juries of three and completely heterogeneous juries of five with
neutral alternatives) that the probability of a correct verdict is maximized
when the median-ability juror votes first. The order of the last two voters
does not affect the correctness probability. When the voting order is fixed,
honest voting (for the alternative that is more likely to be correct at the
time) is generally suboptimal — jurors need to vote strategically. However
there is always some voting order where honest voting produces the highest
correctness probability achievable by strategic voting.
It would be useful to find optimal voting orders for larger juries and for
voting schemes other than simple majority. Also, one could consider sequen-
tial voting schemes where a voter knows some but not all of the previous
votes.
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